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In September 1952 the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs, J.W. 
Beyen, extracted from the Council of Ministers of the ECSC. a 
commitment that the future European Political Community envisaged 
in the treaty for the European Defence Community would also be 
entrusted with economic tasks. This has usually been understood in 
the literature as an important origin of the European Economic 
Community. This paper considers Beyen's initiative in the long­
term context of Dutch attempts to reduce tariffs and non-tariff- 
barriers to trade in western Europe since 1949. In this context 
the paper shows how Beyen was able to maintain the momentum of the 
Dutch proposals although the European Defence Community treaty 
itself always appeared doomed to failure and also why the Beyen 
proposals for a common market appeared on the agenda of the six 
foreign ministers of the ECSC countries when they met again at the 
Messina conference. The pasper examines the divisions within the 
Dutch cabinet on this question as well as the mixed, occasionally 
hostile, reception which the proposals received from the other 
five member states of the ECSC. In doing so it shows the 
centrality of these economic issues, rather than defence 
questions, to Dutch participation in the discussions of the 
proposed Defence Community and by analogy the centrality of the 
same long-term Dutch policies to any participation in any other 





















































































































































































THE BEYEN PLAN AND THE EUROPEAN POLITICAL COMMUNITY
The Netherlands had agreed to participate fully in the discussions to 
create a European army only in October 1951, only with great reluctance, 
only by a decision of a divided government and only under strong American, 
French and German pressure. When agreement to the European Defence Community 
seemed the only way to ensure an effective land defence of the Netherlands, 
and only then, did the Dutch accept the management of a common defence as a 
reason for common European political institutions. The Dutch interest in 
such institutions was economic. More precisely it was commercial. Foreign 
commodity trade accounted for more than a third of national income. Most of 
it was with western Europe. Foreign invisible earnings had historically 
always weighed heavily in the balance of payments and there was every reason 
to suppose they would do so in the future. The search for higher levels of 
income and prosperity demanded maximum access to European markets and a 
better regulation of international payments and capital movements. This was 
the reason for seeking common European action.
About the framework within which that common action should be taken 
Dutch governments were in a much greater state of confusion. The Stikker 
proposals of June 1950 had envisaged common action to reduce both tariffs 
and quantitative trade restrictions in the wide framework of OEEC and had 
been prepared for this purpose to concede a marginally greater degree of 
executive and managerial power to the Executive Committee and Council of 
OEEC, particularly in order to provide ’compensations' from a common 
monetary fund to governments whose industries were particularly damaged by 
this process. After December, however, faced with strong opposition from the 
Italian government and the likelihood that the French government was 




























































































this OEEC framework in the hope of getting better results from GATT. This 
was even less successful. The disturbances of the Korean War meanwhile had 
led to the suspension, nominally temporary, of many of the trade 
liberalisation measures which ECA had squeezed out of OEEC in return for 
Marshall Aid.
Any plan in GATT which required the agreement of all members to tariff 
reduction, as had the Pflimlin proposals after the Torquay conference in 
1951, was more or less doomed to failure because of the presence there of 
underdeveloped economies also. Europe looked the only feasible framework for 
Dutch action. But that meant encountering French intentions to maintain 
protection either by tariffs or quantitative restrictions. The extension of 
preferences by the existing processes of tariff bargaining so as to create a 
preferential tariff zone in western Europe, along the lines of the Italian 
proposals in summer 1950, would only be economically helpful to the 
Netherlands if it produced results very quickly, in the first round of 
negotiations in fact. It would not do anything about quota restrictions. It 
might well not get the agreement of GATT. A gradual resumption of the 
process of trade liberalisation, that is to say joint removal of quotas 
under OEEC supervision, would presumably again encounter the same 
resistance. It would also not serve the purpose of providing sure and 
growing markets for Dutch agricultural exports, because there was no 
likelihood that countries would be any more willing to reduce their barriers 
against agricultural imports than they had been in 1950. There were 
therefore certain persuasive arguments that nothing could be achieved 
without the creation of some new European body with a political mechanism 
which might force a process of change in the desired direction.
The High Authority of the ECSC was of course just such a body. Its 




























































































Netherlands would probably never have accepted such a form of political 
machinery. The small coal sector and the even smaller steel sector in the 
Dutch economy both worked at relatively high levels of efficiency and were 
in no serious economic or political danger of having to make much adjustment 
as a result of the institution either of the common market or the High 
Authority. Even so the political shape of the institutions of the Community 
had been greatly changed in the negotiations because of Dutch pressure. The 
Assembly, the Council of Ministers, the advisory committee, the Court of 
Justice, all had been strengthened in their position relative to the High 
Authority, because of Dutch opposition to the apparently uncontrolled 
technocratic, interventionist form which the French proposals had originally 
wished to give to the High Authority. The Netherlands had sternly resisted 
all attempts to transpose the political concepts and machinery of the 
Monnet Plan to a European level, and there was great opposition inside the 
Dutch government to repeating this experiment, even in the modified form in 
which it had come into being, for any other sector of the economy.
This had become clear in the cabinet struggles over Mansholt's 
proposals for a similar high authority to regulate western Europe's intra­
trade in agricultural products. Like the ECSC such a solution had two 
glaring weaknesses from a Dutch point of view, leaving aside entirely the 
question of how acceptable it was to other, nations. Firstly it placed the 
Netherlands in a separate framework for political action from the United 
Kingdom, when the United Kingdom was one of its two most important 
commercial partners and a crucial military ally. Secondly it placed the 
Netherlands in a political framework where French influence would be 
preponderant. And since French policy was to strengthen the domestic methods 
of economic management by extending them through western Europe this augured 




























































































agreements which, except in agricultural products, was not exactly what the 
Netherlands was .looking for and presented obvious dangers of subordinating 
Dutch domestic economic policies to the French interest. These French 
pressures were obvious in the negotiations over the EDC, especially in the 
French insistence on coordinating western European armaments production and 
production by a centralised Commissariat directed by Monnet’s successor in 
the Commissariat au Plan. It was this which had brought the EDC negotiations 
to deadlock at the end of 1951. Furthermore France showed little interest in 
any European association wider than the six members of the ECSC. It was a 
cardinal point of French policy that if new European organizations with real 
powers came into existence their purpose must also be that of retaining the 
West German republic in the integrated western European framework. The ’six' 
had been painfully constructed for this purpose in the iron and steel sector 
only after its construction had failed in the foreign trade and payments 
sector. In effect the rationale for now once more confining to the six 
members of the ECSC the development of foreign trade rules in western Europe 
was a purely pragmatic one. Its damages were mitigated by the existence of 
the European Payments Union which continued to operate its own trade rules 
in the wider OEEC framework. In that sense demanding a liberal common market 
as part of the federated western Europe which the EDC was supposed to bring 
about could be construed as exercising pressure to make the OEEC trade rules 
more liberal. It served the purpose of strengthening the Franco-German peace 
treaty and association embodied in the Schuman Plan and the Treaty of Paris 
as well. This was certainly of overwhelming importance to the Netherlands, 
but the problem of Dutch foreign trade was one which went far beyond the 





























































































It was also true that the bargaining position of the Netherlands was 
stronger in the six than in a wider setting, because, as the Schuman Plan 
negotiations had proved, French policy was unrealisable without some 
agreement with the Benelux countries to act in concert. In fact in the wider 
forum of the OEEC the Netherlands had had little influence on the process of 
trade liberalisation and the tortuous negotiations on agricultural trade in 
the OEEC Food and Agriculture Committee had produced a state of total 
disillusionment. A reasonable weighing up of the Dutch chances of improving 
the international framework of the domestic Dutch economy after 1950 would 
have pointed to the six as a more promising framework for political action, 
although the chances of success could not be viewed optimistically. 
Furthermore, if the ECSC was actually going to be extended into a European 
Political Community (EPC) in order to bring the European army under some 
form of political control, everything spoke in favour of the Netherlands at 
least attempting to gain some concessions in return for its adhesion to this 
new European political body and even trying to convert it into a body which 
would have an economic, rather than a merely political, purpose beyond that 
inherent in the ECSC.
When the foreign ministers finally produced the draft treaty for the 
EDC in May 1952 the second paragraph of Article eight stressed that the 
proposed constitution of the EDC was or\ly temporary and that it should 
eventually be replaced by a new European organisation. This organisation 
would clearly have to be related in some way to the ECSC either by 
assimilation into it or by a reconstruction of the first Community. The 
existing Court of Justice was to serve also for the EDC. On the other hand 
the members of the proposed parliamentary assembly would be the members of 
the Council of Europe with some additions. Everything pointed towards a 




























































































ensured that the European Commissioners for Defence would in no sense have 
the same degree of independence from national governments as the High 
Authority. The possibility therefore existed that because the new European 
organisation which was to be created would not have the same independence or 
strongly interventionist character as the High Authority, the other nations 
might not object if it were enjoined with carrying out a programme of 
removal of barriers to trade as well. The investigation of this new form of 
European organisation should, the draft treaty insisted, be undertaken 
within six months of the ratification of the treaty by the proposed EDC 
assembly. The Italian government had then proposed for the meeting of the 
foreign ministers in September in Luxembourg that the parliamentary assembly 
be established immediately in ad hoc form for one specific purpose, to study 
the possible formation of a European Political Community at once without 
waiting for the ratification of the EDC treaty. Any modifications to the 
purely political nature of the proposed EDC would therefore have to be 
proposed in September at the latest.
The proposals had to be formulated by a new government and a new 
foreign minister. Stikker's efforts had all been in the context of the OEEC 
and his dislike of any arrangement, political or economic, which 
disassociated the Netherlands from Britain had been strong. After the 
general election he was replaced by two foreign ministers, Jan Willem Beyen 
and Joseph Luns. Beyen was specifically charged with multilateral relations, 
which included international commercial relations, but Luns was in charge of 
Benelux affairs. As minister of economic affairs Zijlstra had replaced van 
der Brink. Drees remained as prime minister and Mansholt stayed as minister 
of agriculture. The initiative to turn the proposed EPC into an economic 
organisation as well came from Beyen and Luns appears to have had very 




























































































matter of personality than of reaction to events. For both, the central 
issue was the reduction of trade barriers. Stikker having made so little 
progress in OEEC it was normal enough to go about it in a different 
direction whoever was in charge. It is clear, however, from subsequent 
events after the failure of the EDC treaty, that Beyen was prepared to push 
harder and go further than his civil servants towards some form of 
'integration' with the six, always providing that it served Dutch commercial 
purposes which he defined no differently from Stikker. He was simply more 
optimistic about the chances than were his advisers and most other members 
of the government and less deterred by the possible dangers. Although Dutch 
policy followed a coherently rational line throughout the changes in 
government and was essentially a response to the events outside the 
Netherlands the difference that an energetic minister with a will to push 
his own line could make was certainly observable, as it was also to be in 
1955 after the complete collapse of the proposed EPC.
That being said, much more important than personality was the 
repercussive nature of policy formulation in the Netherlands, as in all the 
member states. The French proposals in 1950 for a closer American 
integration into NATO planning had produced the American proposals for 
German rearmament in a European Defence Community. The French and German 
attempts to construct a purely political body to oversee a common defence 
forced the Dutch to the position that if they were forced to accept a 
European Political Community it should have an economic purpose. No side 
actually wanted a further European organisation of any kind, much less one 
with real powers, for its own sake. But if the Defence Community, which by 
1952 only the Germans and Americans really seemed to want anyway, was the 
only way forward towards solving the political problem of combining German 




























































































Europe, it was now not going to be achieved unless the Political Community, 
which in turn was the price paid for ensuring the control of the Federal 
Republic within the Defence Community, also helped to solve the 
international economic problems of the Netherlands. The Dutch government 
would have preferred to have solved these in a wider framework and without a 
further level of European organisation had the possibility existed. Adding 
to the superstructure of an unwanted house built on no foundations of real 
political will or purpose was only likely, of course, to make its collapse 
more certain. But what else can small states do but accept the repercussive 
nature of foreign policy and hope that their interests will not be entirely 
dismissed? It is hardly up to them to change the agenda for international 
negotiation. In this way the structure of the European Political Community 
was to become even more gothic, a soaring mass of complicated and ill- 
connected aspirations to the solution of problems which had only one thing 
in common, the fact that they could not be solved within the national 
frontiers, but were otherwise absolutely different in nature.
This was well expressed by the Dutch Secretary-of-State for Foreign 
Affairs, Hendrik Boon, who considered that the Italian resolution seemed to 
be working from the premise that the establishment of a 'political 
authority' would be the panacea for all the troubles facing Europe but he 
wondered whether the reverse might not be true, —  that in working towards 
and propagating a political community the drive towards solving fundamental 
economic issues might be weakened even further. Besides that, he felt that 
the Dutch should resist any change in the EDC treaty which might imply the 
eventual devolution of any power to a supranational organisation without 
arrangements to protect the individual states' interests. Finally he argued 
that if it was intended to abandon the functional approach to integration, 




























































































studied by national governments (1). In August a state commission was set up 
to advise the government on the whole question of European integration. 
Beyen, however, was determined to stake some sort of claim at Luxembourg 
when the foreign ministers met.
The claim was vague, as it could only be in the circumstances. The 
Assemblé ad hoc, he argued, should consider as well as the political form of 
the EPC the question of economic integration. Van Zeeland supported this 
position completely and de Gasperi had no real objections. This study, Beyen 
also argued, should be implemented under the guidance of the foreign 
ministers who would provide guidelines. Again this idea was supported so 
that Beyen had at least altered the situation in the sense that the foreign 
ministers could lay down, if they were capable of agreement, economic 
guidelines for the future activity of a Political Community (2).
In October the State Commission which had been established to advise 
the government on the question of European integration produced the results 
of its deliberations on the Luxembourg Resolution. It considered that in the 
area of economic integration (and especially in agriculture) it would be 
difficult for the Netherlands to obtain quick results. Indeed it was likely 
that the negotiations would get little further than an agreement that the 
EPC would concern itself with economic questions. It might possibly even get 
round to deciding which economic questions to% discuss. But the whole process 
could be time-consuming. Thus, the Dutch should not enter the EPC unless 
satisfactory progress were made on the economic front. What was needed was 
for an economic study group to be set up with a detailed list of 
instructions, since only in this way could it get on with serious activity 
in the direction which the Dutch wanted (3).
In November, Beyen formulated what he believed should be the basis for 



























































































- 1 0 -
threatened externally by military pressure and internally by communism and 
fascism. To cope with these pressures an increase in production and 
productivity was necessary, but this was impossible as long as Europe was 
splintered into small markets by trade discrimination and monetary 
uncertainty. So far the external threat had made clear that military 
cooperation was necessary and the realisation had grown that this required a 
measure of political cooperation. However the question should be asked 
whether political integration without economic integration made any sense. 
’Political integration which has no content other than making possible 
coordinated military action and organising the production and marketing of 
certain important raw materials can only bring about a very limited unity' 
(4). To a certain extent these remarks must have been directed against his 
cabinet colleagues. It was Drees who had denied the seriousness of the 
military threat to western Europe in 1950. The proposals which Beyen went on 
to make were even less likely to meet with universal accord. Because it 
would be a waste of energy to attack all barriers to trade in whatever form 
the eventual goal must be a customs union. Only this could guarantee the 
institutionalisation of freedom to trade across frontiers. The customs union 
would have to be attained in stages as and when improvements in the separate 
national economic situations allowed. If it were implemented at once 
economic disturbances would produce a resurgence of protection. Here, 
presumably, he had in mind the sad fate of the OEEC trade liberalisation 
programmes. A programme of this kind implied a supranational authority to 
direct it. The first steps should be taken in those sectors where output was 
most restricted by trade barriers. The cabinet should set up a special 




























































































- 1 1 -
The timetable foresaw a further meeting of the foreign ministers at 
Rome in February 1953. By this time the Beyen proposals had taken a final 
and slightly altered shape. The form of the proposed customs union had 
become more specific. No longer was Beyen content to leave the 
implementation of the customs union to any supranational power. Both the 
target date and the timetable for achieving it were to be specified in the 
treaty. Behind the common external tariff there would also have to be a 
programme for removing quantitative trade restrictions, transport monopolies 
and discriminations and barriers to invisible transactions. The Community 
should administer a series of safety clauses under fixed values. To help in 
this the familiar idea from 1950 of a 'European Fund' was resurrected, to be 
deployed by the Community in cases where there were 'fundamental 
difficulties'. The relationships with non-members of the Community should be 
regulated from the start in the terms of the treaty (5). It is hard to 
believe that after the start of 1953 there was any real chance of the EDC 
treaty being passed in the French parliament. The decision of the Mayer 
government to seek additional protocols to the treaty had begun to alter its 
nature without making it any more likely that it would finally be acceptable 
to the national assembly. The new Dutch proposals only exacerbated the 
position, putting ratification and a political settlement of the Franco- 
German question further at risk. Beyen's reaction of course was that it was 
doubtful if a parliamentary majority for ratification could be found in the 
Netherlands without including in the treaty a proposition for a common 
market. Belgium and Italy both supported this position and the conference 
communiqué eventually contained a section reaffirming the Luxembourg 
resolutions and agreeing to study the possibility of implementing a common 




























































































The draft treaty was handed over by the Assemblé ad hoc to the foreign 
ministers in Strasbourg in March at their next meeting for their further 
consideration and in May they met in Paris to pronounce on it.
The treaty envisaged a directly elected parliament, elected at first on 
the basis of the separate national systems but after five years by a common 
European electoral system to be established by the parliament itself. It 
would have 15 seats specially reserved for the Saarland, three more than for 
Luxembourg. Above it would be a Senate, whose members would be directly 
appointed by national parliaments. The Senate would appoint some of the 
members of a European Executive Council and its chairman would appoint the 
others. It could be removed by a motion of no-confidence from either chamber 
of the Parliament. There should also be a Social-Economic Council comprising 
various interest groups which could present advice to the Executive but 
which also had rights of initiative. A Council of National Ministers would 
have the task of harmonising relations between the Executive and national 
governments and exercising any further powers delegated to it by the Senate. 
Finally there would be a Court with responsibilities for ruling on 
interpretations of the Treaty and on questions of constitutional abuse.
Exactly what this impressive constitutional construction was supposed 
to do was rather less clear. On foreign policy the only rights attributed to 
the parliament were the approval of treaties with third countries and 
association agreements. The Council of Ministers was to coordinate a common 
policy in international conferences and to be receptive to proposals and 
advice from the Executive and parliament. The Community was also to have its 
own budget, but its size and financing was left ultimately to the Executive 
and had to be approved by a unanimous decision in the Council of Ministers. 
The amendments which parliament could make had to be within the framework of 




























































































progressively creating a common market but on the basis of measures proposed 
by the Executive, approved by a unanimous vote in the Council of Ministers 
and by a majority of both Chambers of Parliament. There was also to be an 
adaptation fund under parliamentary control. Finally, after two years, the 
EPC would completely take over the control of the ECSC and the EDC (7). The 
economic committee of the Council of Europe reviewing its work in May 
frankly conceded 'The European Community to be set up is endowed in the 
Draft Treaty with economic powers which would make possible a progressive 
development towards a common market. The Draft Treaty does not, however, 
contain any obligatory provisions concerning economic integration, and the 
safeguards foreseen are such that if they are exploited they would make 
impossible any substantial progress towards achieving the objective 
proclaimed. One might almost say that the economic provisions contained in 
the Draft Treaty presented the only possible compromise that could be 
reached by a majority of the Assemblé ad hoc, rather than a unanimous or a 
whole-hearted support for immediate action towards the establishment of a 
common market (by) the six countries concerned' (8).
Meanwhile at the end of April, the Dutch Commission set up by Beyen had 
formulated its first conclusions. The economic sub-committee, having pointed 
out that the realisation of a common market was not just a question of 
removing trade barriers but also of harmonising monetary and social policies 
which artificially distorted national structures, went on to criticise the 
Beyen proposals as being inadequate by themselves for the realisation of 
their own ultimate goals. 'The opening of frontiers', it warned, 'is almost 
impossible as long as a certain measure of coordination has not been 
achieved in the areas of general economic, financial, monetary and social 
policy.' It recommended that article 82 of the draft treaty be amended 




























































































and a common external trade regime. But it argued against fixing a 
definitive end date partly because the realisation would depend on the 
progress towards harmonisation elsewhere, partly because no one was likely 
to agree to it and partly because it was outside the Dutch principles - 'it 
is about integration and not a unitary state'. Apart from that it 
recommended some procedural changes made in the way the safeguard clauses 
were dealt with and the way the fund was administered (9). The institutional 
sub-committee was much less iconoclastic as far as the main lines of Dutch 
policy were concerned. It warned against the early subsumation of the ECSC 
and EDC into a new political community, because it would require a 
substantial modification of both treaties and also because it would deflect 
attention from the wider economic task. On the other hand it recognised the 
force of those arguments which said that if one were striving for political 
economic integration it was illogical to maintain the existence of separate 
functional communities. Perhaps, it suggested, a compromise could be found 
along the lines of a partial subsumation or by aiming for a later date. 
Secondly, the subcommittee was opposed to the senate electing the chairman 
of the Executive and the chairman in turn appointing the rest. It preferred 
to leave both questions to the Council of Ministers. It was not too 
enamoured either with the balance within the senate, where it preferred an 
equal representation for all states, but it felt that to achieve this, the 
Dutch might have to concede a form of representation in the parliament based 
on the size of population, which would leave small states in a worse 
position than envisaged by the treaty. It made no recommendation of its own 
on the question of direct elections (10).
Beyen's simple formulation of economic integration virtually 
exclusively in terms of a customs union was challenged by the higher civil 



























































































- 1 5 -
serious, however, was the challenge from within the cabinet that the Dutch 
had gone far enough already. This group was led by the Prime Minister, 
Willem Drees. He stated quite bluntly that the Six were too unbalanced to 
form a political community. Political instability hamstrung the decision­
making process and there was, besides, a lack of political will for its 
creation. There was still absolutely nothing to show for the Dutch 
initiatives to date. And finally, he argued, if the Six did manage to create 
the whole institutional structure, it would probably fail anyway. To this 
Beyen replied equally frankly that if the government had felt in its heart 
that nothing would come of the negotiations it should have said so before 
they began. In this he was supported by Mansholt who argued that the 
Netherlands should not pull back from the course upon which it had embarked. 
Finally Drees backed down but at the same time made it absolutely clear that 
the creation of a customs union was the minimum and absolute condition for 
Dutch participation in the EPC. If all that resulted from the negotiations 
was an involved institutional structure with no advantage for the 
Netherlands, he reserved the right to resign from the cabinet 111).
In formulating the Dutch reply to the Projet de Traité, Beyen therefore 
ignored the advice of the economic sub-committee and insisted that a date be 
stipulated in the treaty by which all tariff and quantitative restrictions 
on intra-trade should be abolished and a common external trade regime should 
be established. He did, however, take up the other points. In view of the 
disinterest in cabinet in the political motives for the EPC, although the 
Dutch memorandum could have dealt with any point in the treaty, it made no 
mention of the institutional clauses at all (12). Beyen explained later to 
cabinet that the memorandum had been designed to keep the initiative in 
Dutch hands, any institutional points he could respond to verbally. 




























































































at the meeting of the six in Paris, he explained that he had drafted a 
number of economic articles for an eventual treaty which he would table if 
necessary. He was advised only to proceed with such a text with extreme 
caution. The other main conclusion of cabinet was that the draft treaty 
should not be referred back to the Assemblé ad hoc, as the Germans wanted, 
but should be dealt with at governmental level, albeit with some contact 
with the Assemblé (13).
At the meeting of the six ministers of foreign affairs in Paris on 
12/13 May, Adenauer did not take up the position the Dutch had anticipated, 
but one which for them was much worse. What the ministers had before them, 
he argued, was a draft treaty which would enable the ECSC and the EDC to be 
married in a system of democratic control. And that was what the ministers 
should strive for without trying to give the EPC any other attributes, which 
would only delay or might even endanger its implementation. There were a few 
institutional questions to be sorted out and then it could be left to 
government experts to draft a final text. This extreme 'minimalist' position 
was not shared by Hallstein who, in Adenauer's absence, suggested that the 
German government could largely agree with the draft treaty and was not 
averse to giving the Political Community functions outside that of 
controlling the existing institutions as long as these were firmly agreed 
beforehand. However, he did share the Chancellor's concern that the treaty 
be agreed as soon (and therefore with as few amendments) as possible. The 
German position, as stated by Hallstein, was most closely approached by de 
Gasperi who wanted the inter-governmental conference envisaged by the EDC 
treaty to be called as quickly as possible so that a final treaty could be 
agreed. At the other extreme, however, van Zeeland pointed out that far from 
dropping the economic clauses in the draft treaty, as Adenauer appeared to 




























































































ex pan ded. This position was supported, naturally, by Beyen and also by 
Bidault who, waving the text of the draft treaty in his hand pointed out 
that half the articles had nothing to do with the ECSC or the EDC at all. 
What was involved was 'une Europe presque totale'. In the end a hopelessly 
optimistic timetable was agreed. There would be a further ministers’ meeting 
in a month's time which would be immediately followed by an inter­
governmental experts' conference whose work would be finished a fortnight 
later and ten days after that, the Ministers would meet again to review the 
results (14).
For France it was a useful delaying manoeuvre to set about studying all 
these other aspects of the problem and Bidault now even requested that these 
should be agreed first before the purely military and political aspects of 
the treaty were ratified. In one sense this made the Dutch proposals merely 
abstract because the strong probability now was that the treaty would not be 
ratified by the French national assembly and any delay in presenting it only 
increased this probability. But in another sense this meant that in the 
world after the rejection of the treaty the Dutch proposals would be on the 
agenda for action as the least objectionable aspect of the treaty. Beyen 
obtained from the ministers agreement that a committee be set up to study 
the common market proposals at once and report on them to the next 
ministers' conference. Again this received van Zeeland's support.
The difficulties of the French government, the general elections there, 
the voluble opposition to the treaty, the German determination not to see a 
policy on which they had staked so much collapse, led to successive 
postponements of the alleged moment of decision until the end of September, 
when the full meeting of the foreign ministers and their deputies in Rome, 
originally set for July, eventually took place. There were less formal 




























































































political and military aspects only. This long interval gave the Dutch 
government time to take stock. So long as Beyen's proposals had involved 
only statements of principle they were useful and harmless. Setting up a 
study committee to report to the foreign ministers, however, meant that 
after the débàcle it was their report which might be on the agenda. What it 
was the Netherlands would then really want out of the situation required 
further definition.
Even before the Rome meeting in May the prime minister had objected 
that Beyen’s proposals, even if written into the draft treaty, would not go 
far enough to meet Dutch needs. The proposals foresaw that the executive 
body of the EPC should fix a programme for abolishing tariffs and quotas and 
that this programme should be subsequently approved by the parliamentary 
organs. As far as Drees was concerned there must be a guarantee that 
something would actually happen, that there should be an automatic process 
of tariff and quota reduction and not one dependent on the voting in the 
Executive and the parliamentary assembly (15).
The difficulty here was to get agreement at international level on an 
automatic process. The opinions elsewhere as tested out by van der Beugel 
and Linthorst Homan on a tour of the capitals in May did not suggest this 
would be easily reached. Belgium was the only other strong supporter of the 
customs union concept but the standpoint in Brussels was not the same as in 
the Hague. A customs union would, the Belgians argued, have also to provide 
for freedom of capital and labour movements. It could not, however, cope 
with changing the monetary systems and policies because currency 
convertibility, which was essential to the operation, would have to be 
reached and managed in a wider framework than that of the six. Elsewhere, 
Italy and Luxembourg while not openly opposing the Dutch proposals showed 




























































































to be created some form of economic integration would have to be part of it. 
In the Federal Republic opinion could hardly be weighed up, it depended on 
which ministry was assumed to be making policy and on guesses about the 
power of Adenauer to make recalcitrant ministers accept his view of the 
prime political importance of the treaty. As for Monnet himself, although of 
course he would have accepted the widening of the ECSC into the EPC, he was 
strongly against the Beyen plan as a definition of the purposes of a future 
EPC (16). The Ministers' meeting in Baden-Baden in August provided a further 
opportunity for testing the waters for the reaction of the others but it 
provided little by way of new insights. Taviani was slightly more positive 
in expressing the Italians' support than might have been expected from van 
der Beugel's and Linthorst Homan's report, but he warned that the EPC was a 
political statute and not an economic one. Bech expressed Luxembourg’s 
reservations on the free movement of labour and the removal of agrarian 
protectionism, at least as far as Luxembourg was concerned. But since 
neither Italy nor France nor Germany had come prepared for involved economic 
discussions, that was as far as it got (17).
As early as the beginning’ of June the Dutch cabinet set about fixing 
the instructions of the delegates to the Rome conference. Beyen and Luns 
suggested that the delegates be instructed to push for a term of 10 years to 
be written into the treaty for the realisation of a customs union, a point 
which was eventually accepted despite the fact that both Drees and Zijlstra 
considered it too long. Beyen pointed out that if the time-scale was 
shortened it would lead to an increase in the number and complexity of the 
escape clauses. Aside from that, the opinion in cabinet was unanimous that 
the delegates should work from the basis of the Beyen Plan, that they should 



























































































- 2 0 -
Netherlands should not join the EPC unless it had a real economic content 
(18).
The experts met together in plenary session in Rome for the first time 
on 22 September and confined themselves to a general exposition of national 
positions. The Belgians were firm in their standpoint that the Community 
should be more than an organ linking the ECSC and the EDC. On the 
institutional side, they wanted collective responsibility in the Executive 
(i.e. that the parliament could not insist on the dismissal of one member) 
and 'paritair' representation in the senate. Moreover they wanted a 
secession clause introduced into the Treaty. Hallstein, representing the 
German delegation, wanted far more clarity on the relationship between the 
various proposed organs of the Community. He was not opposed to the 
incorporation of the EDC and ECSC as envisaged in the treaty, seeing any 
difficulties as technical rather than political. Finally he supported the 
Benelux position of wanting more economic tasks entrusted to the Community, 
emphasising in particular the monetary question. The Italians, too, 
supported the Benelux position on economic questions and the German position 
on the question of incorporating the two communities. They supported a 
directly elected parliament, but wanted the membership to reflect more 
closely national population distribution, though they were willing to 
consider a 'paritair' senate. Tjara van Starkenborgh Stachouwer, leading the 
Dutch delegation, stressed the Netherlands' demand for automatism in tariff 
integration and reduction, the reserve on incorporating the other two 
communities and the postponement of direct elections. The Luxembourg 
delegate confined his opening comments to a demand for a 'paritair* senate, 
whilst the French declared themselves unable to make a declaration at all at 
that moment (19). The reason for the French position was broadcast on the 
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between the MRP, who wanted a construction for the Executive similar to that 
argued in the draft treaty, and the Gaullists (20). At the next session, the 
French prime minister asked for understanding for the difficult position in 
which he found himself, but he was at least in a position to reject as 
unacceptable the Dutch demands for automatism in the procedure towards a 
customs union. Moreover it became clear that he wanted the economic clauses 
to be framed very generally so as to be subject to later treaties. On 
institutional questions, he considered a directly elected parliament 
acceptable and a 'paritair' Senate possible, but he did want a shift in the 
balance between the Council of Ministers and the Executive in favour of the 
former. To this Hallstein had replied that Germany, too, considered a 
political community shorn of economic clauses useful in its own right as 
promoting 'sachliche und politische Ziele'. With the battle lines so drawn, 
the experts decided to entrust their further deliberations to two working 
groups, one devoted to economic issues and the other to institutional 
questions (21).
The differences apparent in the opening sessions manifested themselves 
immediately in the first sessiofi of the economic working-group. At the one 
extreme were the French who argued that the incorporation of the EDC and 
ECSC into a European Community was an important step in itself and warned 
not to move too far ahead of public opinion in trying to do more. Closest to 
them, though at some distance, were the Italians who argued that the new 
Community should have some economic tasks but wondered if everything had to 
be regulated by treaty at this stage. The Dutch, hammering on the need for a 
timetabled customs union, found themselves in the middle-ground. Next came 
the Belgians, who, whilst supporting them on this question, asked if a 
customs union, without measures to coordinate national economic policy, was



























































































- 2 2 -
were of primary importance, but made no statement on the desirability of a 
customs union itself. Luxembourg, according to the Dutch report, 'made some 
unimportant comments' (22). The following day was devoted to a largely 
inconclusive discussion on how further to proceed but it did provide three 
additional standpoints: that the Germans were prepared to consider a certain 
degree of automatism in the achievement of tariff reduction; that the French 
were willing to cooperate in any common investment policy to remove 
obstacles in the way of a common market and to give the Community the right 
of initiative to make 'propositions and recommendations' for the achievement 
of that market, and that Luxembourg could agree with anything the rest 
decided as long as it did not have to surrender the protectionist privileges 
it enjoyed in Benelux! (23).
The next day the various standpoints began to clash for the first time 
when the delegates settled down to discuss the issue, 'Definition of the 
common market'. No-one was particularly happy with the definition tabled, 
which was limited to goods only, and eventually 'services, capital and 
labour' were added. It was at this point that the Germans wanted added to 
the definition the statement that, 'the achievement of this final goal 
presupposes a financial and economic policy based on analogous principles, 
which would in particular have the effect of guaranteeing the financial 
stability of the member states' (24). This was broadly supported by the 
Belgians but not by the Dutch, who argued that a common market referred 
solely to the removal of economic frontiers. If, as a result of an 
inflationary policy in one country, it ran a balance of payments deficit 
with the rest, the country could either draw on its reserves or 
international credit or it could allow its exchange rate to fall. In either 
case the common market will have been left intact. Thus one could not argue 
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precondition for a common market, let alone part of the definition. The 
French, whilst not accepting the full rigour of the Belgian/German position, 
argued that it should be seen as a precondition. If a country, for 
historical reasons, had a high price level, it would import more or export 
less. Unless such a country were able to limit its imports it would soon 
encounter great financial and monetary difficulties. The problem, explained 
the French, was that the ministers at Baden-Baden had said that the states 
must retain sovereignty, so that it was impossible to agree to such a 
measure of policy coordination as the Germans proposed, since that would 
mean, for example, that France would have to discuss its Indo-China 
difficulties with the Community, which was unthinkable. The whole matter, 
they argued, required a new political decision by governments after Rome 
(25).
The deliberations then shifted to the question of 'measures to be taken 
in order to achieve the common market*. The Germans had submitted an aide 
mémoire which placed monetary and financial harmonisation on an equal 
footing with the elimination of trade barriers. On the first point it 
stressed the need among member states for budgetary equilibrium and a 
monetary policy sufficiently constrained to ensure currency convertibility 
on current account at least. On the latter it stressed the gradual abolition 
of tariffs and quotas on intra-group trade and the erection of a common 
external trade regime 'appropriate for the encouragement of international 
exchanges' (26). The discussion first centred on the point of the external 
tariff and surprisingly there was general agreement on the fact that it 
should not be autarchic, but that still left a wide range of alternatives 
ranging from the lowest to the highest or a trade-weighted average per 
product. Presumably thankful that there was some agreement, that question 
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their intention in stressing budgetary equilibrium to rule out the 
possibility of countries following a counter-cyclical policy, the session 
was adjourned (27). Two major questions had been left hanging in the air, 
how were financial and economic policies to be coordinated and exactly what 
was to go into the treaty concerning the creation of the customs union? That 
discussion was bound to come but, in the event, it was triggered by the 
Italians who argued that it was inappropriate to fix executive steps and 
dates for a process of integration which would demand a long period of 
preparation and evolution (28).
The German position was defined before the meeting by von Maltzan in a 
private conversation with Linthorst Homan. 'The only thing we want', he 
said, 'is that we six should not retreat on the monetary question'. 
Referring, presumably, to the British proposals for a more general, 
coordinated approach to currency convertibility in the western world he 
described these proposals as 'immensely dangerous, because they could break 
apart our group'. In the meeting itself he proposed that the six form a 
'convertibility club' which could take initiatives towards real 
convertibility in a group larger than the six (29).
The German solution both to the Dutch demand for 'automatism' and for 
the question of policy harmonisation was to give the Community rights of 
decision and the power to make its own legislation. This was supported by 
the Belgians since it would ensure that countries could not sabotage 
progress towards the common market. For the French, it was unacceptable to 
move rapidly to a Community; given over to the old liberal ideas of 'the 
game of competition' which would lead to the enrichment of the rich and the 
impoverishment of the poor. Would it not be better 'to integrate in order to 
liberate rather than to liberate in order to integrate'? However, the German 



























































































- 2 5 -
sovereignty. ’Recommendations’, rather than 'decisions', were the most they 
were prepared to concede to the Community's Executive (30). It was at this 
point that the discussions were suspended since the experts had to knock 
together some kind of report and there was only a week to go. Because of the 
lack of time, it was agreed that the report would list a number of general 
principles and that the position of each delegation would be recorded on 
each point (31).
Looking at the conference as a whole one thing was clear from the 
start, the French reaction to the inclusion of any commitments to 'economic 
integration' was negative in the extreme! This in itself handicapped the 
attainment of much consensus over the various elements of the Beyen Plan. A 
further problem was that the Beyen Plan (as it existed in its three separate 
memoranda) was not accepted as a conference document. Moreover, the Dutch 
delegation felt that they were handicapped by the very detail in which the 
Beyen Plan was worked out. Almost every detail called forth a psychological 
or political reaction and the overall direction of the proposals tended to 
get lost. Another factor was that there was very little negotiation in the 
strict sense of the word. Finally economic integration, to be successful, 
required both liberalisation and harmonisation but the Dutch standpoint 
seemed to require automatism in the first case but not in the second. 
Because what the Dutch wanted was a guarantee that something would indeed 
happen, their delegation pressed hard for room at the next foreign 
ministers' meeting to make concessions which might produce a better front 
against the French (32).
Even while the Conference of experts was going on, there were clear 
signs of a split beginning to emerge within the Dutch cabinet on this 
question. On 28 September Mansholt wrote to Beyen urging him to modify the 



























































































- 2 6 -
aims for economic integration was beginning to evaporate in favour of an 
acceptance of a pQlitical treaty which, in line with French thinking, would 
do no more than link the ECSC and the EDC within a common institutional 
framework. Although he himself was not against such a treaty, he felt it 
would hamper further progress towards economic integration. Yet this 
development was difficult to deflect given the instructions binding the 
Dutch delegation which did not it to make any concessions to the Germans on 
monetary questions and none to the Italians on social issues. Such 
concessions would make it clear that the Dutch viewed economic integration 
in terms larger than a tariff union. As long as this was the case, the 
French had a free hand and the danger increased that the economic paragraphs 
would disappear from the Treaty altogether. He felt that the Netherlands 
should accept a situation in which a common market would be regulated by a 
separate agreement or else that the Community itself be instructed to 
prepare such an agreement. 'This limited auto-extension has so far been 
rejected by the Dutch government, but if our concrete plans should strand on 
too much resistance, I would prefer it above the omission of a every of 
sentence on economic integration in the draft treaty and also above a purely 
platonic mention in the goals' (33). It shifted Beyen not one inch. In a 
somewhat high-handed reply he argued that the reaction to the Dutch 
proposals in Rome surprised him not in the slightest but 'it has been our 
strength that amid all the wavering, changes in position and opportunism we 
have met from our friends in this company we have stayed firm by a simple 
and clear proposition’. Political integration without a task in the economic 
field would be an 'empty husk' which would do Europe more harm than good. 
The purpose of the Rome Conference was to inventory government reactions and 
it would be premature to alter the Dutch position since it would only create
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appro pri ate time for the cabinet to take new decisions (34). When Mansholt 
raised the question of introducing some suppleness into the Dutch 
negotiating position in cabinet, he received no support whatever. Beyen did 
not see the risk that the French and Germans would push for a limited treaty 
as very great. Moreover he argued that the minimalist French stance was more 
a reflection of the fact that it had no position (vide the disagreement in 
cabinet) than an indication of what French policy would be when it 
eventually emerged (35).
At the end of October Beyen produced a memorandum outlining the range 
of possible Dutch concessions. The target date for achieving the customs 
union could be set back to fifteen years. Because no one else would accept 
the automatism of tariff reductions it might be possible to stipulate that 
half the reductions be automatic and completed halfway through the 
transition period while the executive body could decide on the rest. It 
might be possible to accept Belgian and German wishes to give the Executive 
powers over policy harmonisation, but only if the removal of trade barriers 
proceeded at the same pace. This was not much. And it must not prejudice the 
Dutch position that steps to the customs union must not be dependent on a 
unanimous voting procedure in the Council of Ministers of the EPC nor upon 
repeated parliamentary ratifications (36).
In cabinet Beyen acknowledged the danger that the forthcoming foreign 
ministers' meeting in The Hague might reach agreement on the constitutional 
questions whilst the economic issues could be referred for further study. 
This would be completely unacceptable to Drees who felt that you could only 
establish the form of the EPC once it was clear which tasks it should get. 
If agreement were reached on the political points the Dutch would be under 
pressure from the others to let it operate immediately and leave the
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be no compromise on the political front until agreement on economic 
questions was reached, a point which was supported by other ministers. 
Moreover there was a majority in cabinet against making the time-span for 
the implementation negotiable (37). Such, then, was the position of the 
Dutch government on entering the The Hague meeting —  a position which, in 
practical terms, boiled down to pushing for further study of the EPC in its 
entirety by groups of experts (38).
At the last moment Mansholt tried again to convince cabinet that it was 
essential to bring the EPC into operation quickly. This meant abandoning its 
standpoint on a customs union, giving the task of the realisation of 
economic integration to the proposed executive body and recognising that 
nations had a right of veto. This found virtually no support. The views of 
Drees were representative, 'Even if the French only want a head-dress for 
the ECSC and the EDC, the Netherlands should still say no, in view of the 
fact that we should not be prepared to surrender part of our sovereignty for 
the creation of an empty husk' (39).
Even this was probably overstating French ambitions by 26 November when 
the Hague meeting of foreign ministers took place. Bidault himself could not 
attend until the last day and that, together with the fact that the 
government had not been able to discuss its position with the French 
parliament meant that the meeting was unlikely to get very far in making 
decisions (which for the Dutch/Benelux strategy was possibly an advantage 
since it made it easier to push the case for the installation of a study 
commission). In fact the proposal to set up a study commission was accepted 
relatively painlessly (though one could wonder why the French should bother 
since Parodi explained that as far as the French were concerned the 
fundamental aim of the EPC was to link the ECSC and the EDC under a single 




























































































report of the Rome conference and it should have its report completed by 15 
March 1954 (40). The cabinet decided that no new instructions for the 
delegates to the Paris study group were necessary (41).
It hardly seemed any longer a matter of real concern. The Study 
conference did not meet until 8 December and the negotiations proper did not 
start until 7 January. It then divided into three commissions —  an economic 
commission, an institutional commission and a commission to study the 
question of European elections. Of these, the economic committee was the 
most important for the realisation of Dutch goals but it took almost a week 
to get going at all largely because the French spokesman, Wormser, kept 
insisting that the discussions should not go beyond the terms of article 38 
of the proposed treaty and that if the Community were to assume new economic 
tasks, that was something over which it could deliberate and upon which 
governments could decide at a later date. Eventually, to stop the talks 
stalling altogether, it was agreed that French reserves could be stipulated 
and recorded on every single sentence if necessary (42). However, although 
the schism separating the French from the rest was the most evident, and 
from the Dutch standpoint the most welcome, there was a further split which 
was much less promising: namely that Italy and Germany seemed to be thinking 
more in terms of a traité normatif rather than the traité executif which the 
Benelux countries considered necessary to ensure some real economic progress 
(43). The Economic Committee, however, did not so much function as a 'study- 
group* or a 'negotiating platform’ at all in the early weeks but attempted 
instead to unravel the text of its report at the end of the Rome conference 
and to stick it back together again in a somewhat more logical fashion. The 
one positive point was that the Germans pulled back from their flirtation 
with a traité normatif. On the other hand, the Benelux cooperation which had




























































































place, in the first days, the Belgians had presented a list of questions to 
form the Committee's approach, without prior consultation with the Dutch, 
which did not appear to give primacy to a free exchange of goods as a 
principle goal (in the event, nobody paid any intention to the list anyway). 
More damaging to mutual cooperation was the Belgian attack on the Dutch 
system of sauvegarde suggesting that it would be rendered totally 
unnecessary if liberalization were preceded by a system of strong policy 
coordination. Not only did this go beyond earlier Belgian sentiments on 
giving the executive powers to impel monetary coordination, but it propelled 
the Belgians almost directly into the arms of the French wanted nothing 
better than 'intégrer pour libérer*(44).
The French were distantly tolerant of the rest wanting to concretise 
points which they considered irrelevant whilst the Italian delegation still 
had received no instructions owing to a simmering cabinet crisis (45). One 
of the first points was the realisation of the customs union, or was it an 
economic union or was it something in between? By the time they had sorted 
that out, what was to become the new French strategy made its first 
appearance. Should not the appeal to GATT be made on the basis of article 25 
instead of article 24 since certainly clauses 5-c and 7-c of article 24 were 
less attractive than a possibly revised article 25. Of course France's 
reserve remained intact that, as far as they were concerned, none of this 
belonged in the treaty. After the delegates had followed that red herring to 
the bitter end, the Germans said that they were not sure it was relevant 
anyway since they at least had not agreed to the automatism in the Dutch 
proposals and that they could not really talk about GATT until the question 
of harmonisation had been discussed. At this point Linthorst Homan seems to 
have lost his temper and suggested that if the others did not like the Dutch 




























































































themselves so that there was at least something to discuss. When the 
discussion resumed only Belgium supported the Dutch position that an end- 
term for a customs union should be included in the treaty. Germany suggested 
a mixture of automatism and supranationality whilst the Italians felt that 
the whole question depended upon the degree of progress towards policy 
harmonisation and the removal of ’structural barriers’. The new German 
suggestion lay in the direction of the compromise Beyen had already 
considered making and was, moreover, acceptable to the Belgians (46). The 
Dutch, however, did not make that concession and so, when it came to 
discussing how tariffs could be lowered, the gulf opened up again (47). It 
was at this point that the French made a proposal for a preference agreement 
- mentioning specifically, as an example, French grain exports. The Dutch 
chairman referred to this as a 'bomb in the conference hall' to which the 
French replied that it was a normal extension of European solidarity which 
could be decisive for French public opinion. The question was shelved (48).
On the question of free movement of labour, the Germans and Belgians 
expressed the worry that the ethnic composition of certain regions could be 
affected; a point conceded by the Italians who felt that safeguarding 
clauses could play a useful role. Germany, moreover, expressed reserves 
about whether the principle should be extended to cover all professions 
(doctors, lawyers etc.) but agreed to look into the matter again. Luxembourg 
wanted itself exempted from whatever the rest agreed. (49)
Policy coordination was also discussed by the experts for the first 
time in any detail. Germany emphasised the distinction between positive 
coordination which would help promote changes in economic structure and thus 
facilitate the realisation of a common market, and negative coordination in 
the sense of removing differences in national policies or regimes impeding 




























































































warrant community intervention - monetary and financial instability, unfair 
competition and balance-of-payments disequilibrium within the six. When the 
Dutch suggested that an opening be left for the Community to intervene in 
areas not foreseen, the Belgians rejected it on the grounds that this would 
imply auto-extension. The Community, according to the Belgian suggestions, 
should be able to give directives on questions of discount rates, bank cash 
and liquidity ratios, the level of central bank loans to governments, the 
development of the national debt and the size of budget deficits (50). There 
followed a discussion on the issue of safeguarding clauses which was now 
more or less the mirror image of the co-ordination discussion - those who 
wanted the first saw little need in the second and vice-versa (51). And then 
everyone settled down again to prepare an agreed text which properly 
reflected the full extent of disagreement.
At this point the French reverted to a minimalist/obstructionist 
position which, the Dutch observed, only served to drive the rest closer 
together. Moreover, the German tendency not to push too hard for their own 
position and to try to omit areas from discussion which might prove 
unacceptable to the French was now abandoned. Even the Italians who, in 
their desire for a traité normatif had been closest to the French position 
were now completely ’uncoupled'. The report itself had resolved very little. 
The time had come for political decisions (52).
Two months of work in Paris had altered very little when compared with 
the situation arrived at in Rome. There were a number of reasons for this. 
The first was that the Rome report was declared by the Hague Meeting an 
’official’ document, even though it reflected little more than the listing 
of six sets of government instructions to the respective delegates. Although 
the Paris conference was supposed to be an exchange of views by unprejudiced 




























































































instructions and that any divergence from the Rome Report was seen as a sign 
of weakness. A second factor was the approaches of the delegates themselves. 
The French delegation, the Dutch reported back, 'continually attempted to 
throw sand into the works by continually trying to initiate discussions on 
problems of detail; the Germans are extremely cautious and hardly ever speak 
out clearly or else they try to push problems aside as a result of which 
they often continue to travel round in a vicious circle of vague slogans; 
the Italians seem to be working on direct instruction from Rome and refer 
back every important point and the Luxembourgers, true to tradition, remain 
silent'. But the Dutch themselves were equally to blame as Linthorst Homan 
(who was heading the delegation in the economic commission) pointed out 
caustically. Their freedom for manoeuvre,outside the minor concessions 
authorised, was minimal. They had detailed proposals in one area (which was 
seen by all the other delegates as insufficient) but no room in their 
instructions to be able to consider seriously the proposals of the others on 
other areas. This in fact could have wasted the chance of forming a closer 
position with Belgium, Luxembourg, Germany and Italy none of which was 
against trade integration but saw the problem of a 'common market' in a 
wider perspective than the Dutch but the Dutch could make no concessions. In 
the end Van Starkenbourg Stachouwer (head of the overall Dutch delegation) 
had brought this to Beyen's attention and in drafting the final report, the 
Dutch had dropped their reserves on a number of points concerning policy 
coordination. However, not only was this too late in the day to make any 
difference, but, as Beyen cynically explained afterwards, it would 
demonstrate that the Dutch at least had seen the exercise as a study which 
did not bind the governments; he could always reintroduce Dutch reserves at 





























































































When the Dutch cabinet met to review the results of the Paris study 
conference in April 1954 the clearest point visible to all was the gulf 
separating France from the rest. Louis Beel, the Vice Prime Minister, 
commented on the irony that the Dutch had gone along with the EPC because 
France apparently wanted it as a condition for ratifying the EDC. The 
situation now was that France seemed to be exceptionally negative on the 
question of both the EPC institutions and the powers it was willing to give 
them and that the ratification of the EDC seemed to have split the country 
down the middle. The general consensus in cabinet was that there was little 
point in formulating the Dutch position until it was clear what the French 
were going to do. Mansholt, who thought that the Dutch should push ahead 
allowing the new EPC organs to implement the proposed 'economic 
integration', found himself in a clear minority (54).
The next Council of Ministers meeting asked the study conference to 
resume its work. So in May the experts trudged back again to Paris to resume 
their work and it was decided in both committees that the aspects they would 
study should be as 'neutral' as possible. In the economic committee the 
French delegate, Soutou, had explained that his country's position had been 
so vague in the earlier talks because of French difficulties in the OEEC. 
Since these had been resolved, a new dynamism had been imparted to French 
economic policy and they could now talk more openly. 'We are emerging from 
the circle of protectionism', he proclaimed (55). Whether any of the others 
believed him is not clear. When the talks began in earnest, however, it 
became apparent that little had changed. The French position remained that 
everything would be settled in a later treaty whilst the Germans had 
reverted to a conciliatory stance towards France though, rumours had it, 




























































































agricultural ministries over the economic implications of freeing trade
(56).
Nonetheless a number of new ideas did emerge. On the question of how to 
implement a customs union the Germans revived the idea that a starting 
period of two or three years should follow the working of the treaty, after 
which the Community would proceed to the implementation of a customs union. 
This band-wagon was immediately jumped on by the French who had always 
wanted a starting period, although a much longer one, before moving towards 
integration. Since, by this stage, it was unclear who was talking about
what, the others stuck to the position that the date for the implementation 
of the customs union had to be fixed in the treaty (57). As for the question 
of how to arrive at that customs union, the Germans outlined a number of 
routes other than the strictly arithmetical approach of the Beyen-Plan: 
differential tempos for different sectors, reductions by weighted averages, 
beginning by 'capping' highest tariffs and exempting the lowest and then 
proceeding to a common scheme. The Dutch now moved away from the Beyen 
scheme and declared a willingness to consider any scheme as long as it 
included a measure of automatism and ended, at a specified time, at a nil- 
tariff on intra-group trade, but that was still insufficient to bring round 
the French (58). As far as the external tariff was concerned the range of 
options lay between the French insistence that it should be high, so as to
improve the chances of GATT concessions, and the Benelux position that it
should be as low as possible. This succeeded in resurrecting the French idea 
of preferential purchasing - if, for example, the duty on grain were low, 
there would have to be an agreed grain-programme. The position of the 
Germans and Italians did not emerge (59). At the last meeting, in July, the 
discussion focused primarily on a Belgian document on Benelux. It was agreed 




























































































In August Mendes-France called together a meeting of the Six 
governments which met in Brussels, at which France demanded a number of 
further concessions on the EDC Treaty which, he argued, were necessary if it 
were to have a chance of success in the French parliament. The other five 
were equally resolute in their refusal to amend a treaty they had already 
ratified, especially since the French were not willing to put anything in 
its place (61). On 31 August the French national assembly rejected the EDC. 
Since the EPC existed solely by virtue of the EDC, the whole edifice came 
tumbling down. The whole question of German rearmament was eventually 
resolved by the creation of the Western European Union, but the push towards 
'economic integration' seemed to have come to a grinding halt.
Looking back over the economic negotiations within the context of the 
European Political Community it is important to bear in mind that they all 
took place at a time when few political commentators would have given the 
European Defence Community, which underpinned the whole structure, even the 
slightest chance of ever being ratified by the French Parliament. Yet armies 
of diplomats, civil servants and so-called experts from six countries were 
locked together for months in Rome and Paris discussing the economic and 
political structure of a new community. The archive situation allows us to 
do no more than speculate over the answer to this apparent paradox. The 
first possibility is that the leaders of the six were trapped by the very 
expectations which they had created and that none of them was willing to 
attract the odium for allowing the initiative to fail. This seems highly 
improbable, certainly as a consensus, partly because it seems likely that at 
least some of the six had other motives for keeping the initiative going and 
partly because, if such had been the consensus, the best tactic would have 
been to allow matters to drift and not to begin by setting up layer upon 




























































































study groups was certainly consistent with this second attitude. But if it 
was not a dance of the dead, what was it? The second possibility lies at the 
other extreme of the spectrum namely that leaders such as Adenauer believed 
to the bitter end that the EDC would be created and he was supported in that 
by the American Secretary of State, Dulles. Along this line of thinking, 
once the log-jam had been broken, the EDC i the EPC and a limited economic 
community would all, in turn, come into existence. However, this alone would 
appear to be an insufficient explanation. The explanation becomes more 
plausible when a third possibility is admitted namely that, even if the EDC 
were to be written off as dead, there were those European federalists who 
considered that the EPC itself was worth salvaging. Certainly the Italian 
position, which throughout the whole episode remained closest to the 
original conception of the draft treaty of the Assomble ad hoc, would 
suggest that de Gasperi considered this a real possibility. Add to this a 
fourth option, that the Dutch and the Belgians, whilst disagreeing over the 
best approach, considered it important to keep the issue of European 
protectionism on the political agenda even if progress were minimal, and 
there is a majority which for diverse reasons had an interest in keeping the 
political process alive.
For the Dutch at least the failure of the EPC had temporarily cut off 
one route but the tariff question remained'unresolved and its resolution 
would ultimately have to come from an international solution. Eventually, it 
could be argued, a situation would arise when other countries wanted 
something else so much that they would be willing to pay the Dutch price for 
its participation, in the form of an agreement to lower tariffs. After all, 
the Dutch institutional reservations had all been accepted early on in the 
Schuman plan negotiations because France and Germany wanted a coal and steel 




























































































first place because France, Germany and Italy had at the time wanted a form 
of democratic control over the EDC. Thus, when a year later the Beyen/Spaak 
initiative linked the call for the creation of a customs union with a plan 
for the joint regulation of atomic energy, it could be interpreted as an 
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